📰 [The Voting Wars of the 21st Century — Part 1]In the Shadows of Rigged Elections: Is South Korea at the Center?
🧩 Prologue
In recent years, allegations surrounding electronic voting systems and early voting practices have surfaced across various countries.
What draws particular attention is the involvement of South Korea-made election technologies and devices, which have become a point of concern for some foreign media outlets and domestic critics.
Though no definitive evidence has yet proven these claims,
South Korea—long proud of being a "democracy exporter"—must now confront a new question:
How transparent are we, really, in this domain?
🌐 A-WEB — Between Idealism and Reality
Founded in 2013 under the initiative of South Korea, the Association of World Election Bodies (A-WEB) has promoted “the spread of democracy,” supplying electoral support systems and equipment to dozens of countries.
However, suspicions have emerged in several developing nations regarding the integrity of the electronic voting systems linked to A-WEB.
Notably, during the 2018 presidential election in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), opposition groups and civil society voiced concerns over the introduction of these machines.
✔️ There is no official record of the Congolese government filing a formal complaint against South Korea.
✔️ Nor has there been clear, public evidence showing Korean text on the machines used.
🏭 Domestic Printing Clues & Rising Questions
Meanwhile, online videos and reports have raised suspicions that the DRC’s ballot papers were printed in South Korea.
One such video featured a factory interior with Korean-language signs like “Observe Work Hours” and “No Cell Phones,”
and scenes of what appeared to be a foreigner supervising local workers.
Although these visuals do not serve as direct proof of election fraud,
the lack of official explanation about why ballots for a foreign election were being printed in South Korea has only deepened public confusion.
🔍 Language Settings & System Transparency
Language configuration in electronic voting machines is another controversial point.
Korean-made machines may have Korean included as a default language during development.
Yet there has been no confirmed instance of Korean language appearing on actual voting machines deployed on-site,
and no diplomatic dispute or public protest in the DRC related to this issue has been reported.
Still, we must ask ourselves:
- Are South Korean election systems transparently audited before being exported?
- Do the recipient countries' voters know their voting systems were made abroad?
- Who takes responsibility if errors or misconfigurations occur?
🗣️ Is “There’s No Problem” Really Enough?
In South Korea, many still respond with “There’s no fraud” or “These are just conspiracy theories.”
But elections do not run on results alone — they run on public trust.
The refusal to even allow questions about legitimacy may, in fact,
pose a greater threat to democracy than any machine glitch.
📌 Conclusion — Structural Solutions Over Emotional Responses
We cannot conclusively say that South Korea exports election fraud.
However, as more countries adopt Korean systems,
we bear a growing responsibility to ensure their technical transparency and political neutrality.
If we are to be an exporter of election technology,
then our systems must be built for full transparency and global scrutiny.
🧷 For the Public Interest
※ This article is not intended to defame any individual, organization, or nation.
It is a piece of investigative journalism aimed at protecting the public’s right to know and enhancing the international transparency of election systems.